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The availability of capital was a common problem for European and Mediter-
ranean states in the early modern period. The inadequacy of taxation revenues, 
the escalating costs of military engagement, the upgrading of war machinery 
and the need to strengthen defences meant that rulers became more inclined to 
turn to banks and wealthy merchants to obtain more rapid flows of currency. 1 
While the powerful states on the mainland battled in the wake of the 
Protestant Reformation, Hospitaller Malta, on the Muslim-Christian frontier, 
was engaged in the "lesser war" against corsairing. Faced with the Barbary 
threat from North Africa, and forever wary of the Ottomans, the Order of St. 
John had to grapple with the fmancial burdens of plying the surrounding wa-
ters, fortifying its defences and, probably most daunting, providing for a grow-
ing population. Although it never engaged directly in a full-scale conflict after 
the siege of 1565, Hospitaller Malta constantly faced shortages. The corso and 
income from property on the continent seldom met the needs of the Treasury, 
forcing the Order to search for alternatives to bolster its fmances. 
Founded in Syria in the eleventh century, the original role of the Or-
der of St. John was to assist pilgrims bound for the Holy Land. Using be-
quests, donations and direct purchases, the Hospital acquired property through-
out Europe. These were grouped into estates (commanderies); the commander-
ies in a given territory comprised the priories, which were combined according 
to the eight languages that comprised the Order. Income from produce, leases 
and legacies provided the Hospital with most of its income. The funds the 
priories were obliged to send to the convent (Hospitaller headquarters) were 
lFor an overview of the costs of war in early modern Europe, see P. Ken-
nedy, The Rise and Fall ojthe Great Powers (London, 1989), chapters 2 and 3. 
International Journal of Maritime History, XVII, No. 2 (December 2005), 193-210. 
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ories were obliged to send to the convent (Hospitaller headquarters) were 
called responsions. 2 
The Order's transition to a permanent military role took place in the 
twelfth century. It was dictated by the pressing military needs of the Frankish 
settlements in Syria, a frontier territory where confrontation with Islam was 
inescapable. By the time of its sett1ement in Malta in 1530, the Hospital had 
accumulated centuries of experience in warfare and was fully incorporated into 
Christianity's effort against the Ottoman Turks. Its participation in concerted 
maritime expeditions against Islamic fleets and outposts was periodically solic-
ited by the Christian forces. 3 
Apart from sustaining this military initiative, the Order was burdened 
with the defence of its new post. 4 Victory in 1565 spared the island from Mus-
lim occupation and endowed the Order with glory, but it left Hospitaller Malta 
scarred psychologically. The fear of another Ottoman onslaught tormented the 
Order and conditioned the life of the convent unti1 the later part of its stay on 
the island. This siege phobia, a legacy which pre-dated 1565 and reached back 
to the Knights' background on Rhodes, stayed with the Order and was periodi-
cally nurtured by rumours of Turkish preparations for war: a warning from a 
foreign envoy; a piece of hearsay delivered by an occasional merchant on his 
return from the Levant; a reference by a spy in the Porte; a report by the 
commander of a Christian ship stopping to replenish supplies; or a snippet ac-
cidentally overheard by an agent in a foreign court. 5 Although such news often 
proved unfounded, nothing could be disregarded without investigation, which 
often was time consuming. But if confirmed, these rumours caused the Order 
2C.H. Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism: Fonns of Religious Life in Westem 
Europe in the Middle Ages (London, 1989), 211-213; H.J.A. Sire, The Knights of 
Malta (London, 1994), 3-10; and A. Hoppen, "The Finances of the Order of St. John 
of Jerusalem in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Europe Studies Review, IlI, 
No. 2 (1973), 106 and 109-110. Income came from the spoglio - eighty percent of a 
Hospitaller's property which passed to the Order after death; the mortuary - the fruits 
of a commandery from the date of a commander's death until the start of the next fi-
nancial year (1 May); and the vacancy - the fruits of the commandery accumulated in 
the following year. More income came from the passages, sums paid by newly-admitted 
Hospitallers. In 1533 the Order fixed a new, permanent rate for the responsions. 
3Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism, 212-213; and B. Dal Pozzo, Historia 
delia S. Religione Militare di S. Giovanni Gerosolimitano detta di Malta (2 vols., Ve-
rona, 1703-1715). 
4In 1530 Charles V also entrusted the Order with the defence of Tripoli in 
Barbary, which was lost in 1551. Sire, Knights, 63 and 66. 
5After withstanding the siege of 1480, the Hospitallers lost Rhodes to the 
Ottomans in the siege of 1522. Ibid., 51-59. 
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to introduce some short-term measures, such as summoning more Hospital1ers, 
stocking the arsena1s and grain stores or seeking support from foreign allies. 
The 10ng-term measures generally invo1ved improving the fortifications. This 
threat p1aced continuous pressure on the Order's coffers. 
Tracing the state of the Order's Treasury at any time in its history is 
arduous. An in-depth study of its overall fmancia1 management in Malta has 
yet to be undertaken. Since records were not kept systematical1y, such an 
ana1ysis cou1d provide on1y a partial, and sometimes distorted, picture of the 
Order's fmances. Accounts listing annual income and expenditures were not 
drawn up regu1ar1y, and the existing statements must be used with caution. 
Entries in the income co1umns, for examp1e, at times inc1uded accounts receiv-
ab1e. Occasiona1 accusations and manifestations of dissent by members of the 
is1and's intelligentsia further complicate matters. In 1670, for instance, a mem-
ber of the c1erical community wrote a memoriale accusing the Hospital1er hier-
archy of oppressing Malta's church and people with taxes while refusing to 
disc10se (or use) its considerab1e reserves. Moreover, it was on1y in the 1ate 
seventeenth century that detailed records of expenditures were kept, and on1y 
in the second ha1f of the eighteenth century did the Treasury start to publish 
year-end ba1ance sheets from its receivers, the fmancial agents posted in the 
various priories to channel the responsions to the Treasury in Malta. 6 
It is difficult to argue, however, that while in Malta the Order was 
constant1y under fmancial strain. 7 Noneth1ess, indications of such conditions 
appear periodical1y. In 1767, for examp1e, the Council (the Order's governing 
body) deliberated about appropriate measures to curb the debt. The balance 
sheet for the financial year ending in April 1771 recorded a 10ss exceeding 
80,000 scudi. And in 1775, Treasury officia1s reported on what they described 
as the "huge debts" of the Common Treasury.8 But since such information is 
on1y sporadic, it is insufficient to sustain the argument that the Order con-
stant1y encountered fmancial difficulties and constant1y needed capital. Where 
one can find tangible proof of these problems is in the choice of language used 
by successive magistracies. Indeed, the dispatches from Malta were replete 
with complaints about the dire straits of its coffers and the need for fresh 
6Hoppen, "Finances," 103-105; M.A. Sant, "Coinage Problems Facing the 
Order of St. John in Malta" (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Malta, 1967), 193-
198; and Archives of the Order, Valletta (AOM) 634, 146-148. 
7The exceptionality of the Order's financial crisis of the 1790s warrants spe-
cial attention and will be dealt with separately below. 
8AOM 634, 12 December 1766, 209-210; and AOM 638,495. 
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funds. 9 The frequency of these complaints, and the fact that more often than 
not they were addressed to the Order's agents and ministers abroad, should 
suppress the temptation to dismiss them as ploys to stimulate the generosity of 
foreign princes. It has been claimed, however, that the balance sheets might 
have been tampered with when the Hospital intended to beg for more in Euro-
pean courts. Fernand Braudel, for example, warns against accepting income 
accounts at face-value when discussing Don Juan's report on the possessions of 
Tunis after he captured it in 1573. 10 To meet the need for funds, the Order had 
to adopt a two-fold approach. The first was to draw on its own resources. The 
second was to fmd alternative sources of revenue. In the implementation of 
both measures, Genoa played a significant role. 
The collection of money from its European estates was a recurrent 
headache for the Order. The problem was often at the source, where receivers 
frequently found it difficult to gather the funds. The estates were at the mercy 
of their administrators, the elements and the socio-political situation in the ter-
ritory in question. When and if the funds were collected, the task of transfer-
ring them to the Treasury in Malta presented other problems. The responsions 
collected from the various priories on the continent were usually transferred to 
Malta by well-established routes using a combination of cash and some form of 
credit, mainly bills of exchange and the bolla, the receipt issued by the Treas-
ury which enabled agents to withdraw Hospitaller funds in Europe. The re-
sponsions drawn from the various priories in Iberia and France, which were a 
considerable portion of the Treasury's income, were usually transferred via 
Genoa directly to Malta or to Sicily for exchange purposes. Genoa, in fact, 
was a vital conduit through which remittances from Western Europe were 
channelled to Malta. The city offered some obvious advantages for the transfer 
of capital, including geographic location. 11 
9Some examples may be found in AOM 1421, ff. 228v-229r, Lascaris Castel-
lar to the receivers of Palermo, Naples, Rome, Florence, Lombardy, Venice, Bohemia 
and Germany, 10 October 1643; AOM 1424, f. 134v, Castellar to the receivers of Pal-
ermo, Naples and Florence, and the procurators of Messina and Genoa, 10 August 
1646; AOM 1445, f. 289, Cotoner to Ambassador Correa (Rome), 22 December 1676; 
AOM 1460, f. 30, Wignacourt to Ambassador Sacchetti (Rome), 18 March 1695; 
AOM 1507, Pinto to Grimaldi, 13 October 1749; and AOM 1515, ff. 48v-49r, Pinto to 
Grimaldi (Genoa), 27 February 1761. Dal Pozzo, Historia delta S. Religione MiZitare, 
also refers to similar financial shortages. 
IOHoppen, "Finances," 104; and F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the 
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (2 vols., London, 1972), I, 475. 
l1See for example, I. Grech, "Gli Orsini e l'alienazione dei beni della com-
menda di San Giovanni di Pre," in J. Costa Restagno (ed.), Riviera di Levante tra 
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In early modern times, Genoa was still a popular port of call for ves-
sels sailing in the western Mediterranean, despite the challenge of Leghorn 
which in the sixteenth century efficiently exploited its free port policy to divert 
traffic to its harbour. Ships coasting east along the Spanish and French shores 
would call at Genoa for provisions and refitting before resuming their trip 
southward to the central Mediterranean. Indeed, the Barcelona-Genoa route 
gained even greater prominence after the Battle of Lepanto, which led to Italy 
being flooded with huge quantities of Spanish capital. 12 
It was normal practice for the Order to exploit scheduled trips along 
this maritime route for the transfer of funds. Its own galleys, those of the 
Spanish crown or even those of Genoa were called upon or chartered to ship 
funds to Sicily or Malta. The sums from the estates of one country or territory 
were grouped and then transferred to ports where they would be loaded onto 
these galleys. Spanish funds, for example, were usually transferred from ports 
such as C artagena , Alicante or Barcelona, while French funds were collected 
at Marseilles. In February 1653, Grand Master Lascaris Castellar enthusiasti-
cally commented on the arrival from Marseilles of a fabulous sum, "the like of 
which has not been seen in the Convent for a long time." 13 
The services of Genoese galleys were often used both for the transfer 
of these funds to Genoa and for their shipment to Malta or Sicily. When the 
monies were deposited in Genoa and needed to be transferred to Sicily, the 
Order at times sought the services of the city' s silk galleys bound for Messina 
which, together with Catania, were the centres of the Sici1ian silk industry. 
Certain logistical criteria had to be met. The transfers to Genoa or Sicily had 
to be coordinated with the voyages of the galleys, which mainly occurred in 
the mild seasons. This was especially important when the Order's galleys were 
involved in some stage of the operation. In 1605 two galleys of the Order's 
squadron on a mission around the Mediterranean called at Genoa to load Hos-
pitaller funds. But in 1606 an attempt to use Hospitaller galleys to transfer 
Spanish funds to Genoa fell through, since by the time the proposal reached 
Malta the galleys had already passed Barcelona on their way to Marseilles. In 
1613 a sum of Spanish doppie deposited in Genoa was to be shipped to Malta 
with the Hospitaller squadron on its return from Spain. In the summer of 1655 
the squadron, returning from an expedition to the Levant, had to wait in 
Emilia e Toscana. Un crocevia per i'Ordine di San Giovanni. Atti dei Convegno 
Genova-Chiavari-Rapallo, 9-12 settembre 1999 (Genoa, 2001), 159. 
12T. Kirk, "Genoa and Livorno: Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Commer-
cial Rivalry as a Stimulus to Policy Development," History, LXXXVI (200 l), 3-17; 
and Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 487. 
13Dal Pozzo, Historia delta S. Religione Militare, II, 228-229; and AOM 
1431, f. 58, Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), 28 February 1653. 
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Messina for four days for the monies being shipped in Genoese galleys on their 
routine trip to load silk. In June 1722 the galleys, then at the service of the 
Viceroy of Sicily, were to leave for Civitavecchia soon after their assignment 
was over to collect and transport to Malta a sum from the Order's ambassador 
to Rome. Cash was not always carried on the large galleys. In 1634 a Maltese 
galiot called in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) with funds for the Hospitaller coffers in 
Venice. Modest sums did not require large vessels for their transport. In 1756 
Grimaldi, the Hospitaller agent in Genoa, had only to wait for a Maltese brig-
antino or speronara returning from Spain to ship 1500 Spanish pieces-of-eight 
to Malta. 14 
Sending galleys solely to transfer funds was a luxury the Order could 
ili afford, and it was undertaken only in times of acute need. For example, in 
August 1655 the entire squadron of seven galleys was to be fitted in the short-
est time possible to be sent to collect 200,000 scudi from France and Spain; 
the urgency was such that the fleet was given strict orders to ignore Barbary 
corsairs sighted in the Maltese channel. In 1708, two galleys were sent ur-
gently to Genoa to collect 100,000 genovine. 15 
Genoa also served as a deposit and redistribution point for the inflow 
of Hospitaller remittances from central Europe and northern Italy. Its position 
as the principal Mediterranean outlet for Milan was exploited by the Order 
more than once for the export of weapons, ammunition and armour from the 
foundries of the Lombard city. The same Milan-Genoa route was used for the 
remittance of funds: it was not unusual for funds from the estates in Germany 
and Lombardy to be collected in Milan for transfer to Genoa. In January 1605, 
the Order expressed its disappointment that only the modest sum of 2735 scudi 
from Milan was deposited in Genoa. Pagliaro, the Hospitaller agent in Genoa, 
was reassured that the flow of funds from Milan would be greater in the near 
future. In 1606, 3600 scudi from Milan were deposited in Genoa for transfer 
to Messina. At the beginning of 1607, 2000 scudi were to be transferred from 
14AOM 1384, f. 229, Wignacourt to Pagliaro (Genoa), 29 July 1605; ff. 
274v-275r, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 25 August 1605; and f. 129v, Wignacourt to 
Pagliaro (Genoa), 9 June 1606; T. Kirk, "The Implications of Ceremony at Sea: Some 
Examples from the Republic of Genoa (16th and 17th Centuries), " The Great Circle, 
XVIII, No. 1 (1996), 2 and 4; AOM 1383, f. 92, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 2 April 
1605; AOM 1389, f. 118, Wignacourt to Caloro (Genoa), 24 April 1610; AOM 1392, 
f. 339r, Wignacourt to Caloro, 4 July 1613; Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 604; AOM 
1384, f. 318r, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 23 September 1605; AOM 1385, f. 380, 
Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 16 December 1606; AOM 1392, ff. 324v-325r, Wignacourt to 
Caloro, 22 June 1613; AOM 259, f. 124v, 20 July 1655; AOM 267, f. 167, 10 June 
1722; and AOM 1513, f. 116v, Pinto to Grimaldi (Genoa), 20 May 1756. 
15AOM 259, f. BIr, 31 August 1655; f. 125v, 6 August 1655; Dal Pozzo, 
Historia delta S. Religione Militare, 11, 227-228; and AOM 265, f. 204r, 1 April 1708. 
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Milan to Genoa. Later that year, the Order was waiting anxiously for the de-
posit of more money in Genoa from its estates in Germany. These funds were 
to be used for the purchase of much-needed wheat. When these remittances 
were instead directed to Venice, the Order's agent in Milan, Quartieri, was 
quick1y told to make amends. In 1610, after 7900 scudi had already been trans-
ferred to Genoa via Milan, the Order was again annoyed that the German 
funds were being directed towards the Adriatic instead of Genoa. In 1618, 
4000 libre were transferred from Milan to Genoa. The following year, 1000 
ducats were received in Genoa from Milan. 16 
Once the Order's funds from the European estates were collected, 
normal practice was to transfer them direct1y to Malta or to a Tyrrhennian 
market. The choice often was between Messina or Palermo, Sici1ian cities with 
two of the busiest mints in the Mediterranean, where the remittances could be 
exchanged with relative ease into Sici1ian scudi, a currency which continued to 
circulate in Malta even after the arrival of the Knights. 17 More often than not, 
the Order had to have capital available in Sici1y to buy wheat. Droughts, fam-
ines and market c10sures due to plagues and diplomatic incidents rendered 
Malta high1y vulnerable to food shortages. The umbi1ical cord tying Malta to 
this nearby granary had not yet been severed: failure to import grain from Sic-
ily could lead to famine in Malta, and failure to have the necessary capital in 
Italy could lead to the same peri10us result. 
When the occasion arose, the Order preferred to ship its remittances 
to Sicily, or direct1y to Malta, rather than use the bolle or other forms of credit 
transfer. To lower expenses, the Order sometimes did not insure the funds, as 
happened in 1665 when a cargo of si1ver ingots, Spanish pieces-of-eight and 
doppie were to be shipped from Genoa to Messina or Palermo "at the Order's 
J6"Cavalieri per grazia d'Iddio e per umano ardimento. Commenda di San 
Giovanni di Pre," in La Devozione e il Mare (Genoa, 2000), 58; AOM 1381, ff. 122v-
123r, Wignacourt to Staiti (Messina), 11 May 1602; AOM 1390, f. 276, Wignacourt to 
Caloro, 24 August 1611; AOM 1388, ff. 267v-268r, Wignacourt to Caloro, 14 August 
1609; AOM 1384, f. 40, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 20 January 1605; AOM 1385, ff. 
53v-54r, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 23 January 1606; AOM 1386, Wignacourt to Bertone 
(Milan), ff. 83v-84r, 21 March 1607, ff. 102v-103r, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 24 April 
1607, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, f. 217r, 2 September 1607, f. 239r, Wignacourt to 
Muchental (Germany), 20 September 1607, f. 287, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 14 No-
vember 1607, and f. 287v-288r, Wignacourt to Quartieri (Milan), 14 November 1607; 
AOM 1389, f. 157v, Wignacourt to Quartieri, 12 June 1610, and f. 244r, Wignacourt 
to Caloro, 4 August 1610; AOM 1397, f. 230v, Wignacourt to Caloro, 8 July 1618; 
and AOM 1398, f. 244v, Wignacourt to Caloro, 25 June 1619. 
J7Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 498. A few years after its settlement in Malta 
the Order acquired the rights to mint its own currency, although Sicilian coins contin-
ued to circulate on the island throughout its rule. Sant, "Coinage Problems," 297-298. 
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risk." Such shipments bypassed markets where losses might be incurred 
through the use of bills of exchange. In 1605, for example, to avoid losses due 
to unfavourable exchange rates, arrangements were made to ship funds to 
Messina with the silk galleys rather than withdraw them immediately on the 
market. 18 
As in any age, the transfer of cash was a hazardous enterprise, and 
more so in the Mediterranean world, where piracy and banditry were round-
the-clock professions. Genoese merchants, for example, shunned the land route 
from Cartagena to Barcelona, deeming the sea route safer. Philip II had to 
spend heavily on escorting his specie through French territory ravaged by civil 
war. After 1568, English privateers continua1ly harassed Spanish silver trans-
ports along the Atlantic route to northern Europe. The Order was obviously 
not exempt from such worries. In 1587 a large sum from its Spanish estates 
was lost while being transported from Aragon to Catalonia. In 1639 Spinola, 
the Order's agent in Genoa, was asked to study the best way to deliver a con-
siderable sum to Malta "safely." In 1664 advice was given to deposit funds 
from Aragon in Madrid rather than Valencia, since the trip to the latter was 
deemed dangerous for undisclosed reasons. 19 
Climate, seamanship and the Order's commitment to the Christian 
cause were other factors which affected the transport of specie. When in 1653 
it needed to withdraw funds from Spain while avoiding the losses incurred by 
exchange, the Order considered sending its ga1leys to transport the money in 
cash. But the squadron could only be employed until the following August, 
which meant that the return trip from Spain would have to take place in winter. 
The pilots of the ga1leys, summoned to offer their advice, were opposed to the 
winter trip, claiming that weather conditions would be too hazardous and that 
they lacked the nautica1 and geographic expertise to navigate the northwestern 
Mediterranean. Some had not sailed in those waters during the winter months 
for years and believed that such a trip could not be made without "foreign" 
pilots. Wintering with the ga1leys in Spain, on the other hand, would have cre-
ated provisioning and clothing problems for the crew. The Treasury's advice 
was to freeze the funds in the Spanish priories and postpone the trip until the 
spring of 1655. Such an option was not without its inconveniences for the 
Hospitaller hierarchy, since a spring trip would clash with a commitment to 
send the squadron east to relieve the Kingdom of Candia, which was besieged 
18AOM 261, f. 22r, 8 May 1665; AOM 259, f. 85, 17 November 1653; 
AOM 1384, f. 142, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 3 May 1605; and f. 174v-175r, Wigna-
court to Pagliaro, 8 June 1605. 
19Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 482, 484 and 490; Dal Pozzo, Historia delta S. 
Religione Militare, I, 285; AOM 1418, f. 98, Castellar to Spinola, 24 May 1639; and 
AOM 261, f. 13r. 
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by the Ottomans. Undecided on whether to sacrifice its own interest to its duty 
towards Christianity, Venice and Rome were informed eventually that only 
some of the fleet would sail to Candia. 20 
Diplomacy was also a consideration, although the present study can 
boast of only one relevant episode, which is too meagre to draw any kind of 
conclusion yet too pertinent to be ignored. Genoese-Hospitaller relations had 
been marred since the second half of the sixteenth century by endless squab-
bling over the nature of the salutes at sea and the positions that each side 
should occupy in the various allied Christian armadas assembled for missions 
in the Levant. 21 The creation and observance of the rules of protocol at various 
diplomatic levels have always had their weight in the relations between peo-
ples. In early modern society, however, the recognition of rank, whether in 
courts, military circles or at sea, was sought with a dogged assertiveness 
which, unless studied within the confines of Baroque ceremoniality, baffles the 
modern observer. 22 
In November 1655 the Order's fleet from Marseilles to load funds 
was heading to Genoa to repay debts amounting to 25,000 doubloons. Fearing 
further trouble with the Republic, the commander had been given strict instruc-
tions not to enter Genoa with Capitana, the flagship, but to head further south 
and to harbour in Portofino. The cash in gold coins was to be sent to Genoa in 
two galleys after the first stop at Savona, as was done in July 1613, when only 
two galleys were sent to collect funds from Genoa after the fleet had stopped in 
Savona on its return from Spain. But following advice from the receiver in 
Genoa that it would be more profitable to cover the debt in reali rather than 
gold, Capitana stopped at the quay without entering the harbour and unloaded 
the money. The intention was to leave for Portofino that night, but an abrupt 
change in the weather forced the gal1eys to remain in Genoa. The Hospital1er 
general, however, failed to salute Genoa's flagship, and the squadron was only 
allowed to leave after being forced to render the normal salute. On its return 
trip to Malta, the Hospitaller squadron had its petty revenge on a Genoese 
merchant ship near Civitavecchia. The whole episode sparked off the most 
severe diplomatic rift with Genoa since similar arguments over ritual had 
started a century earlier. Official correspondence was interrupted, and the Or-
2°AOM 259, ff. 99v-100r. 
2lPor a ehronologieal overview of a good number of these expeditions, see 
Dal Pozzo, Historia delta S. Religione Militare, passim. 
22Kirk, "Ceremony at Sea," not only views sueh incidents in eontext but also 
demonstrates the politieal "implieations" that ensued. 
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der withdrew its receiver from Genoa. 23 Normal contacts were only restored 
near the end of the century after arbitration by the Papacy. Consequently, this 
half-century of Genoese-HospitaHer relations contains gaps which the research 
for this study cannot fiH. 
Genoa, of course, had much more to offer than mere geographic loca-
tion and port facilities. The city's renown in the world of finance was highly 
valued by the HospitaHers. Its relationship with capital had been nurtured since 
medieval times. In pre-industrial Europe, where investment in land predomi-
nated, the Genoese, not least because of the constraints of their territory, di-
verted most of their energies to the sea and the management of capital. 24 Their 
banking facilities on a continental scale were among the most flexible and 
sought-after of the age, and their expertise in the field of credit transfers had 
been proven, especially from the second half of the sixteenth century when 
Spain solicited their services to manage the bullion from America that financed 
the war in the Netherlands. They recovered swiftly from the Spanish bank-
ruptcy of 1557; withstood the hostility of the Spanish Cortes and met the chal-
lenge of foreign merchants in every market; dominated the fairs of Piacenza; 
smuggled currency from Catalonia to Italy; and were the undisputed masters in 
dealing with paper money. Genoa' s mint was among the busiest in the Medi-
terranean. 25 Indeed. Like grain, capital seemed to materialise out of thin air in 
Genoa, and the Order, out of convenience, opportunity or sheer need, was 
more than willing to add its name to the list of clients of the maritime repub-
lic.26 
The direct shipment of funds to Malta was often deemed impractica-
ble. 27 Thus, most of the time the Order had to resort to a banking facility or 
other form of credit transfer. Normal practice demanded the deposit of the 
responsions from one region or country in a local bank. The monies from the 
23Dal Pozzo, Historia della S. Religione Militare, lI, 228-230; AOM 1392, f. 
374, Wignacourt to Caloro, 22 July 1613; and Kirk, "Ceremony at Sea," 8. 
240n the territory of Genoa and the district of Liguria, see S.A. Epstein, 
Genoa and the Genoese 958-1528 (Chapel Hil1, NC, 1996), chap. 1; and J. Heers, 
Genova nel '400 (Milan, 1991), chap. 1. 
25Por an overview of Genoese financial activity, see Braudel, Mediterranean, 
lI, especially 500-517. 
26p. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. lIl: The Per-
spective of the World (London, 1985), 162. 
27Por example, in the spring of 1606, the Order had to cancel plans to ship to 
Malta a handsome sum from Barcelona. AOM 1385, f. 155, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 
20 May 1606. 
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French estates, for example, were usually deposited in Lyon and those of the 
Spanish estates in Madrid. 28 The next stage was the transfer of these funds 
using a receipt, the bolla, to a market where large sums of capital were avai1-
able. The choice often was Genoa. Once the remittances from western and 
central Europe were deposited there, the Order had more than one option to 
transfer them to Malta. The choice was ultimately dictated by the contingencies 
of the moment, which varied from the availability of currency and the rates of 
exchange in the main markets of the Tyrrhennian, to the urgency with which 
the island needed currency, to the availability of the vessels for the transport of 
cash. 
The Order's Treasury monitored fluctuations in currency values on 
those markets in which its monies could be exchanged. It often complained 
about losses incurred by the time it received its funds from the continent. 
When the rates of exchange in Sicily were deemed unfavourable or prohibitive, 
the Genoese market was usually an alternative. In May 1605 the Treasury, 
deeming the rates in Palermo "unbearable," asked its agent in Genoa for in-
formation on the rates, the best timing for an exchange and the quantity of 
capital available. When in 1664 the receipts for Spanish funds failed to attract 
a good price in Palermo, soundings were carried out in Genoa in the hope of 
finding more attractive rates. In 1644, on the other hand, up to 40,000 scudi 
were to be transferred to Palermo from Genoa to exploit a favourable rate of 
exchange. If deemed reasonable, funds were cashed in Genoa right away and 
shipped to Malta. More than once, remittances from European estates were 
deposited there on purpose. In June 1606 information on the rates of exchange 
between the Genoese and Catalan markets was required when the Order 
wanted to transfer funds that had been deposited in Barcelona. In 1610, how-
ever, remittances from Milan to Genoa were interrupted after 1300 scudi had 
already been delivered when it was deemed wise to await better rates of ex-
change. 29 
When the funds deposited in Genoa were to be transferred south to 
another Italian city, usually the last step before being sent to Malta, various 
options were considered, and often it was the receiver's job to choose the most 
favourable. In this respect the receiver's role was not unlike that of the Ve-
netian jattori, who were constantly searching for favourable deals for the 
Serenissima in the Levant. In 1605, remittances deposited in Genoa, including 
28AOM 261, ff. 162v-163r, 19 April 1670; AOM 262, ff. 68-69v, 16 July 
1677; and AOM 647, f. 257, 13 February 1705. 
29AOM 1385, f. 155, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 20 May 1606; AOM 260, f. 
179v, 4 March 1664; AOM 1422, f. 55r, Castellar to Spinola, 15 February 1644; 
AOM 1385, f. 192v, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 9 June 1606; and AOM 1389, f. 402, 
Wignacourt to Caloro, 19 December 1610. 
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those from Milan, were to be transferred either to Naples, Palermo or 
Messina. In 1607, F10rence was chosen as an alternative to Genoa for the re-
mittance of funds from Germany. At times Genoa was by-passed altogether. In 
1677, some French and Spanish funds were deposited in Leghorn using Mexi-
can pieces-of-eight and the currency of Sevi11e. The remaining sums were to be 
divided and deposited part1y in Palermo and the rest direct1y in Malta. 30 
The choice to deposit funds in markets other than Malta or Sicily was 
dictated by the needs of the Order and its post. In 1618, remittances from 
Genoa, Lombardy or Venice were expected in Naples for 1000 cantara of bis-
cuits, while in 1622 bi11s of exchange for 1000 scudi were delivered to Naples 
from Genoa to buy biscuits and to cover the cost of bui1ding a new galley.31 
Although maintaining a regular flow of remittances from the continent 
received constant attention, it sti11 did not spare the Order from shortages and 
the need for supplementary funds. A temporary solution was sometimes sought 
through special impositions on the European estates, as in 1558, 1574, 1583, 
1631, 1633 and 1645. Such extraordinary measures, which were usually suc-
cessful, provided relief for the Treasury and enabled the Order to continue 
drawing on its own resources. 32 The obvious limitation of such taxes was that 
their collection was subject to the vicissitudes of the estates: in 1638, estates in 
Calabria were damaged by an earthquake; in 1640, those in Casale were rav-
aged by Spanish troops; in 1650, an agent lamented the consequences of war 
on property in Inverno (five years later, the same agent was stil1 complaining 
about this); and in 1703, the estates in Lombardy were flooded. A year later, 
the Order's Council was briefed about the difficulty of withdrawing the usual 
funds from France, Spain and Portugal due to war. The widespread disruption 
caused by the Thirty Years' War was disastrous for more than one Hospitaller 
priory. Writing on the "stato penurioso della Religione," the contemporary 
historian Dal Pozzo, perhaps not without some exaggeration, described how 
for twenty years no German remittances were received; how damages to lta1ian 
30Braudel, Mediterranean, lI, 465; AOM 1383, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, f. 
334r, 27 September 1604; AOM 1384, f. 95v, Wignacourt to Pagliaro, 2 April 1605; 
AOM 1386, f. 239r, Wignacourt to Muchental (Germany), 20 September 1607; and 
AOM 262, ff. 68-69v, 16 July 1677. 
31AOM 1397, f. 17r, Wignacourt to Balsamo (Naples), 13 January 1618; and 
AOM 1401, f. 190, Wignacourt to Torriglia (Genoa), 9 April 1622. 
32Hoppen, "Finances," 108-109. Those in 1574 and 1583 were made perma-
nent and were added to the responsions exacted annuaIly. 
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estates had reduced the flow of funds from the peinsula; and how transfers 
from Spain had been cut by half. 33 
Verification of the impact of such calamities on the Order' s coffers 
presents difficulties for reasons already discussed. It is clear, however, that 
great losses were incurred. Because of such contingencies, the Order could not 
renounce extraordinary sources of fresh capital. Indeed, the Order was enter-
prising enough to follow the contemporary trend in the larger European states 
by making an overseas investment when it purchased the Caribbean islands of 
St. Christopher. 34 Although innovative, such investments yielded profits only 
in the long term. When capital was needed more urgently, the Order, like 
other states in Europe, had to resort to loans. In the second half of the six-
teenth century, seventy-five percent of the expenditures of Spain and England 
were consumed by war and debt repayments related to past conflicts. By 1651, 
the debt of the province of Holland amounted to 153 millionjlorins. Although 
engaged in a conflict different in scale and nature to the ones which were being 
waged on the continent, Hospitaller Malta was still at war, and this required 
money. In 1581, prompted by several warnings of an attack by the Ottomans, 
orders were given to raise a loan of 40,000 scudi. Although the rurnours 
gradually subsided, they had been alarming enough to warrant the garrisoning 
of the sister island of Gozo. In 1574, envoys were sent to Spain to raise a loan 
of up to 100,000 scudi. 35 According to Dal Pozzo, by 1640 the Order had con-
tracted loans of 192,000 scudi for fortifications. 36 Five years later, an even 
heftier loan of 400,000 scudi was contracted. States devised all sorts of fman-
cial mechanisms to obtain the currency needed to sustain their war efforts. The 
Dutch reverted to public loans to sustain hostilities with the Habsburgs in the 
mid-seventeenth century. In Tudor England, confiscated church property was 
33Dal Pozzo, Historia della S. Religione Militare, lI, 53 and 273; AOM 1419, 
f. 82v, Castellar to Spinola, 16 June 1640; AOM 1428, f. 173v, Castellar to Spinola, 
31 October 1650; AOM 1432, f. 149, Castellar to Spinola, 11 September 1655; AOM 
647, f. 224r, 24 July 1703, and AOM 647, f. 253r, 24 October 1704. 
34For the purchase of the island, see L. de Boisgelin, Ancient and Modem 
Malta (2 vols., London, 1805), I, 77-79; for their profitable sale, see Dal Pozzo, His-
toria della S. Religione Militare, lI, 673-674. 
35Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 87, 89 and 91; and Dal Pozzo, Historia della S. 
Religione Militare, I, 101 and 174-175. 
3~he repayment was effected through the passaggi paid by 120 newly admit-
ted Hospitallers. Dal Pozzo, Historia della S. Religione Militare, 11, 52. 
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sold, loans were raised and taxes increased to reduce the war deficit. 37 The 
services of professional financiers, banker and wealthy merchants were sought. 
The Order also acted as a creditor, even on an international level, and had 
done so since medieval times. 38 In 1603, for examp1e, the Emperor of Hungary 
asked for financial aid to maintain the defences against the Turks; the Order 
attributed its refusal to comply to the burden of its own debts. 39 
Genoa's capacity to obtain the liquidity demanded by the Order, either 
in the form of loans or by clearing bills of exchange, was repeatedly recorded 
in Hospitaller documents. In 1645, for example, the Order turned to its agent 
in Genoa, Spinola, to cover debts in Naples on which large sums of interest 
were being paid. The fol1owing year, Spinola was described as the sole agent 
capable of covering the payment of 60,000 scudi withdrawn from Palermo. 
The next year, the same agent was on the verge of concluding a deal to trans-
fer 100,000 scudi to Palermo to purchase wheat. By October, he had already 
managed to deliver a quarter of this sum, which was quite a feat considering 
the difficulties the Order was encountering in finding the necessary capital. In 
1766 the captains of two Catalan pinks were provided with two bills of ex-
change in Malta to be cashed in Genoa after their wheat cargoes from Girgenti 
(Sicily) were confiscated to replenish the island's granaries. There were excep-
tions, of course. Despite its financial allure, Genoa, like all markets, was sub-
ject to economic forces beyond its control and at times failed to deliver the 
goods, as in 1566, when money was "tight." In 1648, the Order's agent in 
Genoa encountered too many difficulties to raise 18,000 scudi, and by the f01-
lowing February the scarsezza on the Genoese market was still hindering him 
from sending currency to Messina, where provisions were being sought despite 
the bad harvests. Wary of the consequences if the required sum was not deliv-
ered, the agent sent news that France was being less strict with the release of 
the tratte, the licences for the duty-free export of wheat. When the scarcity of 
coins affected more than one market, the Order found great difficulty in clear-
ing the bolle for its remittances from Europe. In 1708 it asked the Universita, 
the body which administered the distribution of wheat on the island, for a loan 
37Ibid., I, 102; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 89; and G. Parker, The Military 
Revolution (Cambridge, 1988), 62-64. 
38Por some examples of the Order's financial dealings during the Middle 
Ages, see A. Luttrell, "Interessi fiorentini nell'economia e nella politica dei Cavalieri 
Ospedalieri di Rodi nel Trecento," in T. Bolelli (ed.), Annali delia Scuola Nonnale 
Superiore di Pisai (Pisa, 1959), 317-326; and Luttrell, "Actividades economicas de los 
Hospitalarios de Rodas en el Mediterraneo occidental durante el siglo XIV," in VI 
Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragoll (Madrid, 1959), 175-183. 
39Dal Pozzo, Historia delia S. Religione Militare, I, 489-490. 
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of 100,000 scudi, with the interest to be covered by the Hospitallers and lay 
members of the population who were indebted to the Order. 40 
Genoa was at times examined simultaneously with other markets. As 
with rates of exchange, before contracting a loan the Order considered several 
markets to seek the lowest possible interest rates. In June 1722 Rome was pre-
ferred to Genoa for a loan of 80,000 genovine since the three percent interest 
rate offered by the former was half a percent lower than that offered in Genoa. 
Three months later, alarmed by disturbing dispatches from Constantinople re-
garding an imminent attack, the Treasury was asked to raise yet another loan 
"in Genoa or somewhere else." When the need for capital was pressing, dis-
patches were sent to various markets to increase the possibilities of a favour-
able reply. In 1622, a loan of up to 60,000 scudi was sought in Genoa, Rome 
and elsewhere. In 1646, in the midst of a difficult decade for Hospitaller 
Malta, Palermo, Naples, Florence and Messina, as well as Genoa, were tested, 
while the Treasury in Malta, as was customary in times of financial difficulty, 
started to mint large quantities of copper currency. Apart from rich Genoese 
merchants, the government of the Republic could also be approached. In the 
early 1760s, another decade of poor harvests in Sici1y with ensuing shortages 
for Malta, the Order officially asked the RepubIic for a loan. The appeal seems 
to have received a cold reception in Genoa despite the persistent demands by 
Grand Master Pinto. 41 
The granting of a loan usually required following certain basic rules. 
Much depended upon the creditworthiness of the debtor; the sounder his reli-
ability and the greater his "repayment potential," the more likely that a loan 
would be forthcoming, sometimes at reduced rates. Seventeenth-century Hol-
land, for instance, was granted loans of mi1lions of jlorins because it was 
backed by considerable economic strength. The Genoese granted loans to 
Habsburg Spain against the assurance of the arrival in Sevi1le of si1ver from 
the Indies. In the second half of the sixteenth century, English borrowing on 
4°AOM 1423, ff. 114v-115r, Castellar to Spinola, 8 April 1645, and f. 258, 
Castellar to Spinola, 19 October 1645; AOM 1424, f. 97, CastelIar to Spinola, 31 May 
1646: AOM 1425, f. 130v, CastelIar to Spinola, 12 October 1647; AOM 1522, ff. 
194v-195r, Pinto to Grimaldi (Genoa), 29 September 1766; Braudel, Mediterranean, lI, 
489; AOM 1426, ff. 205v-206r, CastelIar to Spinola, 11 December 1648; AOM 1427, 
ff. 34v-35r, Castellar to Spinola, 6 February 1649; and AOM 265, ff. 215v-216r, 20 
August 1708. 
41AOM 267, f. 129r, 10 June 1722, and f. 147r, 25 September 1722; AOM 
1401, f. 422, Wignacourt to Ambassador Falco (Rome), Torriglia (Genoa), and 
Scalamanti (Venice), 9 August 1622; AOM 1424, f. 134v, CastelIar to receivers of 
Palermo, Naples, Florence, Messina and Genoa, 10 August 1646; AOM 1517, ff.48v-
49r, Pinto to Gimaldi (Genoa), 27 February 1761, f. 88r, 21 May 1761, and f. 132r, 
27 July 1761; and Sant, "Coinage Problems," passim. 
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the Antwerp bourse was interrupted when English privateers started disrupting 
the transport of Spanish silver. Meanwhile, the only col1ateral the Order could 
offer was its property. The Hospital1er hierarchy strove hard to sustain an aura 
of credibility. The punctual payment of interest and principal often demanded 
creativity and rapid action on the international markets. In 1650, debts con-
tracted in Genoa at eight percent interest were cleared by another loan of 
30,000 scudi contracted in Rome by pledging Hospital1er property in the Papal 
States. In 1715, annual interest of 9000 Roman scudi was covered by taxes due 
the Treasury on all the property in the Papal States and the Kingdom of 
Naples. In 1734 the Treasury proposed substituting Genoese with Maltese 
creditors to clear debts of 80,000 genovine in the Republic. This proposal was 
motivated by the eventual reduction in interest payments and the alternative 
investment opportunity being offered to the pubblico, the creditors on the is-
land. Decisions on similar matters were at times the source of conflict between 
the Treasury and the Council. In 1655, the Procurators suggested that a debt of 
49,000 mezze doppie owed to Genoa should not be paid immediately if annual 
remittances from the Spanish and French estates were not withdrawn. The 
Procurators argued that some other expenses warranted absolute priority. The 
Council overruled this proposal, justifying its decision by the need to safeguard 
its reputation as much as the need to save on annual interest payments. 42 
The Order's efforts to maintain a high credit rating were at times put 
to the test. In 1639, negotiations to borrow money in Genoa were interrupted 
due to the excessive guarantees being demanded on that market. In August 
1722, the Order's creditors in Rome demanded additional guarantees for a loan 
of 80,000 genovine. 43 These, however, seem to have been exceptional epi-
sodes. 
The financial relationship between Malta and Genoa remained alive 
throughout the 1700s. Despite being replaced in 1627 by the Portuguese mar-
ranos as the leading creditors to Habsburg Spain, the Republic managed to 
retain much of its traditional vitality as a fmancial centre, amply capable of 
satisfying the needs of a small state like Hospitaller Malta. When in 1743 the 
Order wished to reorganize its ledgers, Genoa was asked to provide two finan-
cial experts to carry out the task. A document on the alteration of exchange 
42Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 89; Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 482; AOM 258, f. 
211v, 16 March 1650; AOM 266, ff. 153v-154r, 26 March 1715; AOM 269, f. 32, 29 
October 1734; AOM 259, f. 131r, 31 August 1655, and f. 126v, 13 August 1655; and 
Dal Pozzo, Historia delta S. Religione Militare, II, 227. 
43AOM 1418, ff. 141v-142r, Castellar to Spinola, 7 August 1639; and AOM 
267, f. 140v, 16 August 1722. 
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rates between Genoa and Madrid shows that the Order was still channel1ing all 
its Spanish funds through Genoa up to the mid-1790s.44 
By that time the Order was facing a sprawling financial crisis caused 
by the loss of its French estates. Debts were being paid in Rome, Vallado1id, 
Turin, Madrid and Genoa. Loans from the Republic, in fact, were negotiated 
up to the 1790s. In January 1792, Genoa granted a loan of 800,000 livres to 
the Order against a pledge of all Hospitaller property in Liguria, the Genoese 
district. It was to be one of the last negotiations of its kind between the two 
parties. The decade was to end traumatically for both the Repub1ic and the 
Order. Both were sucked into the whirlpool of the French Revolution. The 
anti-religious and highly nationalistic sentiment that swept Revolutionary 
France disrupted the life of the Hospitallers irrevocably. The confiscation of 
the Order's French estates in 1792 deprived Malta of about one-sixth of its 
annual income. Other estates were confiscated in Poland in 1793. By 1795 the 
Order had lost seventy-five percent of its annual continental income. As these 
financial blows escalated, it became evident that the Order was in no position 
to repay its debts. In 1794 a six-year extension was obtained on the loan con-
tracted two years earlier. The repayment, which was already overdue in 1793, 
was finally made in 1798. This postponement provided only insignificant re-
lief, though; more funds were needed, and the Order again knocked on 
Genoa's doors. In the beginning of 1797, the receiver in Genoa, Francesco 
Lomellino, was asked to find a consortium of creditors to lend money to the 
Order. Lomel1ino failed. The Order, understandably, had exhausted its credit 
with the financial circles of the Republic. This proved to be the death knell for 
a relationship between two small worlds overwhelmed by a Europe in turmoil. 
In June 1797, the old Republic of Genoa was declared defunct and replaced by 
the Democratic Republic of Liguria under the patronage of the occupying 
French forces. In June 1798 the French ousted the Order of St. John from 
Malta. The following month, Hospitaller property in Liguria was confiscated 
by the new government, and with it was lost one of the last fmancial connec-
tions between Hospitaller Malta and the Republic of Genoa. 45 
44Braudel, Mediterranean, I, 500-501; AOM 1502, ff. 35v-36r, Pinto to Gri-
maldi, 11 February 1743; and AOM 643, f. 223, 29 September 1794. 
45AOM 274, f. 266v; A. Blondy, "Malta and France 1789-1798: The Art of 
Communicating a Cisis," in V. Mallia-Milanes (ed.), Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798: 
Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem (Malta, 1993), 
666; Blondy, L'ordre de Malte au XV111' siecle. Des dernieres splendeurs a la ruine 
(Paris, 2002); I. Grech, "La confisca dei beni liguri dell'Ordine di Malta da parte delia 
Repubblica Ligure," in J. Costa Restagno (ed.), Cavalieri di San Giovanni e Territorio. 
La Liguria tra Provenza e Lombardia nei secoli XIll-XV11 (Genova, 1999),207-210 and 
212; AOM 267, f. 235, 1 February 1794; G. Assereto, La Repubblica Ligure. Lotte 
politiche e problemi finanziari (1797-1799) (Turin, 1975); P. Nurra, Problemi del Ri-
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The flow of capital between Genoa and Hospitaller Malta was nur-
tured throughout the ear1y modern period. These ties proved strong enough to 
withstand the challenge by other !ta1ian markets and to overcome the disrup-
tions caused by rather long diplomatic interruptions. When relations were re-
stored to norma1ity following the mid-seventeenth-cent~ crisis, the flow of 
capital towards Malta was gradually resumed. The Republic's geographic loca-
tion and potential as a provider of credit were too convenient for the Order to 
forfeit, and fInancial connections were maintained up to the dying moments of 
both parties. As a result, the Genoa-Malta route proved to be one of the most 
vibrant fInancial 1inks along the Tyrrhenian throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
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